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ABSTRACT 
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have been part of aviation from the 
beginnings of manned aviation and have become a vital tool of our overseas 
military and national security operations. Public and private sector interest 
continues to grow for UAS to be used in a variety of domestic missions, such as 
border patrol, law enforcement, and search and rescue. With growing concerns 
over issues, such as border security and critical infrastructure protection, it would 
seem that UAS would be a logical choice for increased homeland security 
support, and yet they remain only in limited use. This thesis examined why UAS 
are not widely used domestically for homeland security support and found that 
their sluggish integration into the National Airspace System stems from a 
perceived flight safety risk. However, UAS operations have improved; systems, 
such as the Predator have flight safety trends equivalent to that of some manned 
aircraft. Nevertheless, government, private industry, academia, and other UAS 
stakeholders should continue to work together to further UAS safety. Specifically, 
they should collaborate to improve UAS component reliability, develop aviation 
regulations and standards to account for peculiar UAS characteristics, and 
improve public perception.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A.  MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis will examine the question, why is it that, even though 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) have become a vital tool of our overseas 
military and national security operations, they are not widely used domestically 
for homeland security support? Unmanned aircraft systems have been part of 
aviation from the beginnings of manned aviation and have become a vital tool of 
our overseas military and national security operations. With growing concerns 
over issues, such as border security and illegal immigration, it would seem that 
UAS would be a logical choice for increased homeland security support, and yet 
they remain only in limited use.  
The United States (U.S.) continues to advance UAS technology toward 
making routine domestic UAS integration a possibility. For example, lessons 
learned in the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan have enabled industry to 
advance electro-optical and infrared sensor technology, navigation systems, 
communication systems, and command and control systems. Nevertheless, 
safety is at the heart of the UAS integration issue. According to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), UAS pose challenges that prevent their ability to 
operate safely and routinely in the National Airspace System (NAS) thereby 
delaying anticipation of routine integration. In addition, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) asserts that UAS flight activity must be conducted at an 





                                            
1 U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration, “Unmanned Aircraft 
Operations in the National Airspace System,” March 28, 2011, 
http://www.faa.gov/documentlibrary/media/notice/N7210.766.pdf. 
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community is in agreement with making safety the first priority for UAS 
operations. However, the challenge has been defining what safe UAS operations 
entail.2  
This thesis will explore the challenges facing routine UAS integration into 
the NAS. Through this examination, I will review the various literatures and offer 
recommendations to address the question of safety as a hindrance to routine 
integration in hopes of providing a useful contribution to the increased integration 
of UAS in the NAS. The specific questions I will consider in this thesis are: 1) why 
have UAS not been more effectively integrated into the NAS; and 2) if safety is 
an issue, are those concerns warranted, and how can UAS be integrated better? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Unmanned aircraft systems can provide new ways for public and private 
agencies to increase operational effectiveness, decrease operating costs, and 
even save lives. Hence, public and private sector interest continues to grow for 
UAS use in a variety of domestic missions, such as law enforcement, search and 
rescue, border patrol, and scientific research to name a few. Some members of 
Congress have even called for an increased use of UAS to improve border 
defense, public safety, and emergency response systems.3 Unmanned aircraft 
are also big business: the Teal Group predicts $94 billion will be spent on UAS 
research, development, and production over the next 10 years, with the U.S. 
government accounting for 77 percent of the research and development 
spending and 69 percent of the procurement spending worldwide.4 However, it 
                                            
2 2010 Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, “Unmanned Aircraft System 
Integration into the United States National Airspace System: An Assessment of the Impact on Job 
Creation in the U.S. Aerospace Industry,” http://www.mckeon.house.gov/pdf/0510jobsreport.pdf, 
9.  
3 Congressman Michael McCaul Website, “Texas Congressmen Call for Increased UAV 
Coverage of Texas-Mexico Border,” April 27, 2011, 
http://mccaul.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=29&parentid=7&sectiontree=7&itemid=1171. 
4 The Teal Group Corporation, “Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will Total Just 




appears that the operational and economic utility that UAS are capable of 
providing is being overshadowed by a sense that they present a flight safety risk, 
underscoring the importance of further research on this topic.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Although the market for UAS is heating up, domestic deployment and use 
of these aircraft has taken a long time to come into effect. My hypothesis is that 
UAS have not been used as much as they could be because of FAA cautions 
about the integration of UAS into the NAS. These cautions stem from concerns 
over what safe UAS operations entail and they have affected the ability of UAS to 
be fully integrated into routine flying operations within the NAS. As an interim 
solution aimed to facilitate safe domestic UAS operations, the FAA employed a 
safety analysis and certification process (known as a Certification of 
Authorization) that must be accomplished prior to approving UAS flights. 
However, according to critics, this process is restrictive and ineffective, and 
increases the time it takes to obtain approval for routine UAS operations. In 
addition, it reduces flexibility that public agencies, namely the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Defense (DoD), need in order to 
fulfill their domestic roles of securing and defending our nation.  
Furthermore, according to a 2008 GAO report, “UAS pose technological, 
regulatory, workload, and coordination challenges that affect their ability to 
operate safely and routinely in the national airspace system.”5 Since this report, 
the government and industry have been aggressively collaborating to improve 
UAS operations. Despite these attempts, some entities still question their safe 
and effective operation in the NAS.  
                                            
5 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions 
Needed to Ensure Safety and Expand Their Potential Uses within the National Airspace System, 
(GAO-08-511), Washington, DC: GPO, May 2008, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08511.pdf. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Literature suggests there is a growing need for UAS domestically. But 
many aviation experts also argue that UAS present safety or other concerns that 
make them difficult to integrate into the NAS. This section will first review the 
literature that sees a need for domestic UAS use, and then examine the 
arguments of critics.  
Just as unmanned aircraft have proven their usefulness for overseas 
national security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have also 
demonstrated their utility domestically. According to analysts, government and 
private entities have recognized their capabilities in various domestic operations 
(i.e., law enforcement, weather research, and pipeline surveillance, etc.) and 
have put pressure on the FAA to facilitate increased domestic UAS operations. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials have reported that “Predator B 
[UAS] has contributed to the seizure of more than 15,000 pounds of marijuana 
and the apprehension of more than 4,000 undocumented people.”6 Also, CBP 
will increase the number of UAS across the country and along the border by 
2015.7 This has contributed to Texas officials (e.g., governor, senators and 
representatives) “leaning on the FAA to approve requests to use unmanned 
aircraft along the Texas-Mexico border.”8 In addition, H.R. 658, the FAA Air 
Transportation Modernization and Safety Improvement Act, recognizes the value 
of UAS for homeland security, law enforcement, and scientific research and has 
introduced steps to advance their integration domestically.9 
                                            
6 Tim Eaton, “Unmanned Planes Could Begin Flying Over Texas in a Matter of Months,” The 
Associated Press, May 11, 2010, http://www.statesman.com/news/texas-politics/unmanned-
planes-could-begin-flying-over-texas-in-681019.html. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Joan Lowy, “Pressure Builds for Use of Drones in Home Skies,” Philadelphia Inquirer, June 
15, 2010, http://ebird.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20100615758060.html. 




Although government and private entities are calling for a greater use of 
UAS domestically, the FAA has been slow to approve greater integration of UAS 
into the NAS, which has resulted in a low level of domestic UAS activity. Four 
primary arguments by critics have led to the sluggish integration of UAS 
domestically.  
First, critics claim that the accident rate of UAS is many times higher than 
that of manned aircraft. One report claims that “CBP UAS have an accident rate 
seven times higher than that of general aviation and 353 times higher than 
commercial aviation.”10 However, it appears that data regarding UAS accidents 
may not be as reliable as critics perceive it to be. The FAA has indicated 
problems in obtaining adequate data on UAS operations in order to assess safety 
and acknowledge that the safety data they do have may not be a representative 
sampling of UAS operations.11 In addition, safety data on military UAS operations 
is pulled from DoD sources and is based on UAS operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, where UAS are typically flown in harsh, high stress environments. 
Even manned aircraft frequently experience “close calls” with other manned 
aircraft on a daily basis in these types of flying environments. Other work 
indicates that systems, such as Predator and Global Hawk were often being 
flown before completion of their development programs. A 2001 report by the 




                                            
10 Sharon Weinberger, “Border Drones Plagued by Mishaps, Pilot Shortage,” Aol News, July 
16, 2010, http://www.aolnews.com/2010/07/16/border-drones-plagued-by-mishaps-pilot-shortge/. 
11 Statement of Nancy Kalinowski, Vice President for System Operations Services. 
Testimony before the House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, 
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism on the Role of Unmanned Aerial 
Systems on Border Security, July 15, 2010, 
http://www.faa.gov/news/testimony/news_story.cfm?newsid+11599. 
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suitable” because it had not completed testing.12 Despite this claim, the system 
was one of the first sent to Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks.13  
Supporters of UAS operations, on the other hand, argue that the UAS 
accident rate might be lower if the Predator and Global Hawk programs had been 
allowed to fully mature under their development programs. Other UAS 
proponents claim that “when a military UAS fails to return from a mission it can 
be impossible to tell whether it was shot down, or crashed because of a systems 
or communications failure.”14 Also, according to a UAS researcher from NASA’s 
Dryden Research Center “the chance of a lost communications link between 
ground pilot and UAS happening during takeoff and landing is minuscule.”15 
Given the diverging opinions on whether UAS can operate safely in civil airspace, 
there is the potential for safety mishap statistics to be misleading.  
A second reason why UAS have been slow to be used domestically 
concerns whether UAS technology is advanced enough to allow safe routine 
UAS operations. Analysts have pointed out that research, development, and 
testing of certain aviation technology had not produced a suitable technology that 
would provide UAS with the capability to meet specific FAA requirements to 
operate safely in the NAS.16 For example, because UAS do not have a pilot on-
board critics claim they cannot directly scan the sky to “see and avoid”17 other 
aircraft as required by FAA regulations. The principle of see and avoid allows a 
                                            
12 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: 
Background and Issues for Congress, by Elizabeth Bone, CRS Report RL31872 (Washington, 
DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, April 25, 2003), 24.  
13 Ibid. 
14 D. Graham-Rowe, "Safety Fears Over Unmanned Planes—Pilotless Aircraft May Soon Fly 
Alongside Your Holiday Jet," New Scientist 178, no. 2401 (2003):  4–5. 
15 Ibid. 
16 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions 
Needed to Ensure Safety and Expand Their Potential Uses within the National Airspace System, 
17.  
17 Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 14 CFR Part 91.113, 
General Operating and Flight Rules, June 2, 2011, 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2011/janqtr/pdf/14cfr91.113.pdf. 
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pilot to operate an aircraft in weather conditions generally clear enough to allow 
the pilot to see where the aircraft is going and to avoid obstacles and other 
aircraft. Some analysts claim that UAS platforms themselves cannot be equipped 
with proper see and avoid technology, such as terrain collision and avoidance 
systems (TCAS). However, according to one Aerospace Science and 
Technology article, “the separation of two aircraft flying under VFR [visual flight 
rules] rely on the see and avoid principle but sometimes fails for reasons like 
closing-in speed or pilot lack of vigilance.”18 This suggests that even manned 
aircraft are not always observant of one another under VFR. According to the 
article, a TCAS can operate to the same level, at which a visual pilot can, thus 
enabling the requirement for see and avoid. This suggests there may be 
alternative technologies that could be used to meet see and avoid requirements 
for UAS.  
A third claim of critics is that federal regulations and standards limit 
domestic use of UAS. Analysts wrote in the Journal of Applied Remote Sensing, 
for example, that the use of UAS can be safer than manned aircraft given certain 
flight profiles (i.e., flying low to the ground); however, the “main limitation for UAS 
integration was the institutional regulations of FAA are cumbersome.”19 In 2009, 
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University conducted an FAA-sponsored review of the 
applicability of UAS to Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs). Title 14 
governs aeronautics and space policy in the U.S. The goal of the study was to 
examine the relevant regulations, policies, orders, etc., to identify the known 
problems resulting from UAS integration into the NAS, among other things. The 
review concluded that the “FAA’s current regulatory system has not evolved to 
include UAS in the NAS and that the unique technological challenges presented 
by UAS and the growing demands and needs of the UAS community call for an 
                                            
18 C. Le Tallec, "VFR General Aviation Aircraft and UAV Flights Deconfliction," Aerospace 
Science and Technology 9 (October 2005): 495–503. 
19 Albert Rango and Andrea S. Laliberte, "Impact of Flight Regulations on Effective Use of 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems for Natural Resources Applications," Journal of Applied Remote 
Sensing 4 (October 2010). 
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appropriate response to implement regulatory change.”20 This supports the claim 
that insufficient regulation is an area that is impacting safety and restricting 
routine integration of UAS operations into the NAS. The author of the study 
recommended that the FAA consider developing regulations that may be “applied 
or revised, and against which new regulations may be developed to provide for a 
safe integration of UAS operations into the NAS.”21 The FAA estimates that 
completing UAS safety regulations will take at least 10 years. To reduce FAA 
workload and expedite the process, some have suggested that the FAA get help 
in writing future federal regulations for UAS operations. 
Other literature suggests that many of the regulations associated with the 
Certificate of Authorization (COA) process are adapted from the manned aircraft 
program and may not be directly pertinent to UAS characteristics and 
capabilities, thus increasing the time to process and approve (or deny) requests 
to operate UAS. According to testimony given by an FAA official before the 
House of Representatives in 2010, “the FAA is working to better standardize the 
review process and increase communication and transparency between agency 
and applicants.”22  
In addition, an article from Aerospace Sciences attempts to address the 
highly debated issue of equivalent level of safety (ELOS), which has become the 
FAA’s underlying principle for any future UAS regulation. The principle of ELOS 
states that before UAS can be routinely integrated into the NAS, the FAA must 
ensure the safety of the public to a level equivalent to that of manned aircraft. 
According to the article, the current standards developed and regulations 
enforced by the FAA to ensure an ELOS may not apply to UAS. The approach 
                                            
20 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Unmanned Aircraft 
System Regulation Review, by L. Kirk, D. Marshall, B. Trapnell, and G. Frushour, (Federal 
Aviation Administration Report AR-09/7), September 2009, 17.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Statement of Nancy Kalinowski, Vice President for System Operations Services. 
Testimony before the House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, 
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism on the Role of Unmanned Aerial 
Systems on Border Security. 
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used to prove ELOS for UAS has been questioned because of the wide range of 
UAS sizes and characteristics, leading some analysts to believe that “this 
approach is not readily applicable to define an ELOS for UAS.” 23  
Fourth, there is a public education aspect to UAS integration that analysts 
claim requires attention. The literature suggests that lack of cultural acceptance 
regarding UAS integration is a problem. Unmanned aircraft systems are 
portrayed by critics as “flying robots used as sentries or snipers that track down 
and kill their intended targets.”24 One article associates U.S. drone patrols in 
Pakistan to a “robot proxy war” while another quotes the British Ministry of 
Defence as saying, “unmanned aircraft are moving us towards a terminator-like 
world.”25 This rhetoric instills fear in the public, according to UAS analysts, and 
poses a challenge to UAS integration in the NAS.26  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
For this thesis, I first examine U.S. government policies and regulations 
concerning the domestic use and safety of UAS, and other work found in 
government records and aviation journals, such as Aviation Week and Space 
Technology. As described above, this review indicates that most of the objections 
and barriers to routine, domestic, UAS operations are related to safety issues.  
Next, I review UAS safety data. As the military is the largest user of UAS 
today, a significant amount of all safety data is pulled from DoD sources and is 
based on UAS operations in Iraq and Afghanistan where they are flown in harsh, 
                                            
23 Konstantinos Dalamagkidis, Kimon P. Valavanis, and Les A. Piegl, “Progress in 
Aerospace Sciences: On Unmanned Aircraft Systems Issues, Challenges, and Operational 
Restrictions Preventing Integration into the National Airspace System,” Aerospace Sciences 44 
(October 2008): 510. 
24 Peter Goodspeed, “When Robots Kill—Urgent Questions Over Drone Warfare,” National 
Post, April 30, 2011, http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/04/30/goodspeed-when-robots-kill-
%e2%80%94-urgent-questions-over-drone-warfare/. 
25 William Saletan, “The Machines Aren’t Rising Quite Yet,” National Post, May 2, 2011, 
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/machines+aren+rising+quite/4707797/story.html. 
26 Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, “Unmanned Aircraft System 
Integration into the United States National Airspace System: An Assessment of the Impact on Job 
Creation in the U.S. Aerospace Industry,” 2010, 9. 
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high stress environments, presumably under high stress conditions, and 
operating in weather conditions as required by mission urgency. Therefore, I will 
conduct an examination of UAS safety records to attempt to determine whether 
the safety statistics cited by critics and by impartial observers, such as the GAO 
actually pertain to the type of domestic operations that homeland security 
requirements will require. This information is usually available in DoD and FAA 
safety reports. I will attempt to identify reasons for mishaps and if needed for 
clarity, I will assign categories to factors that contribute to the causes of UAS 
safety mishaps. Categories will include human, material, environmental, or 
undetermined.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I provides the 
introduction. Chapter II includes a historical background of what UAS is and how 
they have evolved. Chapter III examines the evolution of the NAS and the legal 
framework that governs aircraft certification and operations. Chapter IV analyzes 
safety aspects of domestic UAS operations and includes findings from UAS 
safety records. In Chapter V, I discuss the national strategy for protecting the 
homeland and highlight UAS as an alternative capability to helping to fulfill this 
strategy. Chapter VI concludes my thesis and provides recommendations for 
routine UAS integration domestically.  
 11
II. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS BACKGROUND  
Although unmanned aircraft have been part of aviation from the beginning, 
predating manned aviation, their nomenclature has certainly evolved. In addition, 
their slowed development has drifted with the ebb and flow of financial and 
political support since their first use. Yet, towards the end of the 20th century, 
their utility was rediscovered in performing the 3Ds; dull, dirty and dangerous 
operations,27 as the U.S. increased its military presence in the Middle East. As 
advancement in technologies increased during the 21st century, their 
proliferation has left gaps in how to best integrate them into the NAS for routine 
domestic operations. To address the integration of unmanned aircraft into the 
NAS, it is important to understand how they developed over the years. Therefore, 
this chapter will briefly explore what UAS are and how they have evolved.  
A. UAS DEFINED 
The nomenclature that describes unmanned aircraft is diverse and has 
evolved with time. Some of the most common names associated with them 
include: balloons, drone, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and remotely piloted 
vehicle (RPV).28 Other terms used to describe them include remotely operated 
aircraft (ROA) and remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). The DoD recognizes most of 
these terms and captures them in Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. No matter what their nomenclature, 
each term portrays a common lineage that an unmanned aircraft is “an aircraft 
operated without the possibility or direct human intervention from within or on the 
aircraft.”29  
                                            
27 Dull, dirty, and dangerous operations is a common description given to aircraft that fly long 
duration flights, sampling hazardous materials and are exposed to hostile action. 
28 Department of Defense, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint 
Publication 1-02, June 13, 2007, http://wstiac.alionscience.com/pdf/dodmilitarydictionary.pdf. 
29 Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Unmanned Aircraft 
Operations in the National Airspace System, NJO 7210.766, March 28, 2011. 
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Unmanned aircraft have diverse shapes, sizes, uses, and means of 
control. They range in size from small radio-controlled model airplanes with 
wingspans as small as six inches to large jet aircraft with wingspans reaching 
117 feet (similar to a Boeing 737 aircraft). Some are controlled manually via a 
ground control system, while others may be controlled autonomously through use 
of an on-board computer, communication links and any additional equipment 
required for safe flight. To account for the diversity in unmanned aircraft, the FAA 
has adopted the term unmanned aircraft system (or UAS), which appears to be a 
more common lexicon among aviation enthusiasts today. This term recognizes 
that UAS are systems that include not only the airframe, but other components 
and personnel required to control them.30 Each of the terms mentioned above 
are common nomenclature for UAS and can be found in the various literatures 
that discuss aviation and unmanned flight. However, for this thesis I will use the 
FAA’s “UAS” nomenclature to describe the vast population of remotely piloted, 
operated and/or monitored aircraft that are capable of flying within NAS.  
B. EVOLUTION 
The use of UAS by the military dates back to World War I with the U.S. 
Navy and U.S. Army. In 1917, Elmer Sperry received the first military contract to 
develop an unmanned flight system for the U.S. Navy.31 This early form of UAS 
was designed to be a flying bomb but was cancelled in 1922 due to technical 
problems and a lack of continued funding. However, the U.S. Army was 
successful in its early UAS research program. In 1918, Charles Kettering built a 




                                            
30 Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Unmanned Aircraft 
Operations in the National Airspace System. 
31 John Blom, “Unmanned Aerial Systems: A Historical Perspective,” Combat Studies 
Institute Press (September 2010): 45. 
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bomb. Although the Bug successfully demonstrated its utility as a weapon 
system and was purchased by the U.S. Army for military operations, it was not 
used in combat due to the war ending in late 1918.32  
Unmanned aircraft system programs would not receive the same level of 
attention again until nearly a decade later when the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army 
launched the Anvil and Aphrodite projects during World War II. The two projects 
pursued testing and purchase of bomber aircraft that were taken out of service to 
be used as radio-controlled drones for kamikaze-like and conventional bomber 
attacks on Japanese targets. Although these “assault drones” were somewhat 
ineffective, they proved to be invaluable in avoiding the losses sustained by 
manned aircraft flying over heavily defended targets.33 These early programs 
helped to validate unmanned flight, which later proved invaluable throughout the 
20th century.  
At the end of World War II, General Henry “Hap” Arnold predicted, “the 
next war may be fought by airplanes with no men in them….”34 General Arnold’s 
vision would become reality in the years to come as military aviation took on a 
diverse dimension with the birth of another branch of service, the U.S. Air Force, 
on September 18, 1947. Following World War II until the Vietnam War, UAS 
design and technology development progressed. A newly independent U.S. Air 
Force recognized the operational potential for UAS as a platform for conducting 
reconnaissance flights over areas deemed too dangerous or politically 
unacceptable for manned aircraft.35 In 1952, the first jet-powered UAS, named 
the Q2C, was produced for the U.S. Air Force and helped pave the way as a 
useful system for fast, high-flying aerial reconnaissance.36 This need was 
realized even more when in 1960 a U-2 spy plane flown by Gary Powers was 
                                            
32 Blom, “Unmanned Aerial Systems: A Historical Perspective,” 46. 
33 John Degaspari, “Look, Ma, No Pilot,” Mechanical Engineering (November 2003): 43. 
34 Lawrence Spinetta, “The Rise of Unmanned Aircraft,” Aviation History (November 10, 
2010). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Degaspari, “Look, Ma, No Pilot,” 43. 
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shot down flying over the Soviet Union. Following this tragic event throughout the 
Vietnam War, the Air Force and Navy drastically increased the use of UAS in a 
support role. Between 1962 to 1975 UAS flew more than 3,000 support missions 
over Southeast Asia consisting of photo reconnaissance, decoy, radar jamming, 
and other missions.37  
Improvements in computers and telecommunications technology along 
with the military’s growing need to obtain and transmit real-time data during 
reconnaissance operations were key to distinguishing improvements in UAS 
design during the last two decades of the 20th century.38 Although their use was 
somewhat limited during the Persian Gulf War, the increasing use of and later 
installation of Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers significantly enabled 
UAS to be flown on reconnaissance and targeting missions with greater 
accuracy. Systems, such as the RQ-1 Predator and RQ-4 Global Hawk validated 
this capability when they proved their utility in intelligence gathering during air 
operations over Kosovo during 1999. The operational success rate during this 
timeframe proved even more the concept and value of UAS operations. This 
provided the inertia for increased UAS funding and development as the U.S. 
entered the 21st century.  
The operational conditions and necessities of war in Iraq and Afghanistan 
at the start of the 21st century perpetuated increased development and 
procurement of UAS. Their most common user today is the DoD with a total 
inventory surpassing 6,000 systems.39 Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the 
amount spent on UAS has increased approximately 23 percent annually.40 
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the DoD will need $36.8 billion for 
UAS it plans to purchase through 2020.41 This estimate is based on: 1) the Air 
                                            
37 P. W. Singer, “Drones Don’t Die,” Military History 28, no. 2 (July 2011): 69. 
38 Degaspari, “Look, Ma, No Pilot,” 44. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 69. 
41 Congressional Budget Office, “Policy Options for Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” Publication 
Number 4083, June 2011.  
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Force’s plan to purchase over 300 Reaper and Global Hawk UAS; 2) the Army’s 
plan to purchase 127 Shadow and Predator (Grey Eagle) UAS and 3) the Navy 
and Marine Corps plan to purchase 97 Broad Area Maritime Surveillance and 
MQ-8B Firescout UAS.42  
The flying bombs and target drones used by our armed forces during the 
early 20th century seem far removed from the UAS flown today in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, or along our borders. Yet, their missions remain almost identical; 
they perform strategic and tactical support operations without putting American 
men and women in immediate danger. Overseas, in the war zone, UAS are not 
only used for surveillance missions, but frequently to fly attack missions. A 
Predator UAS equipped with advanced sensors and hellfire missiles can circle in 
position over hostile targets for many hours waiting for the opportunity to attack 
them. Along our borders, UAS can assist border patrol agents detect and 
continuously track critical targets with their state-of-the-art electro-optical and 
infrared cameras. Nevertheless, traditional UAS military intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance, and if required, attack missions, are no longer seen as the only 
contributing role for UAS in supporting national security. A new UAS industry is 
being driven by other public and private agencies as their technology improves 
and is being adapted to civil use.43  
Despite these domestic uses, however, UAS are still not being used within 
the U.S. at a rate that is being called for by political leaders and homeland 
security experts. Government, private industry, academia, and other UAS 
stakeholders have addressed some of the challenges mentioned thus far, albeit 
from a micro perspective. A GAO study concluded that ensuring UAS operate 
safely in the NAS is a new and complex challenge for the FAA, but the NAS 
                                            
42 Congressional Budget Office, “Policy Options for Unmanned Aircraft Systems.” 
43 2010 Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, “Unmanned Aircraft 
System Integration into the United States National Airspace System: An Assessment of the 
Impact on Job Creation in the U.S. Aerospace Industry,” 3. 
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should be prepared to accommodate them.44 Doing so requires agencies to 
better understand the airspace system as a whole, its complexities, rules, and 
challenges. To assist readers with understanding our nation’s airspace system, 
the next chapter will examine its infrastructure and operating procedures.  
                                            
44 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions 
Needed to Ensure Safety and Expand Their Potential Uses within the National Airspace System, 
42.  
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III. NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE 
Despite what some people may see as an unlimited resource, the 
airspace environment in which aircraft fly—manned, as well as unmanned--has 
steadily become complex, congested, and more restricted. This airspace 
environment, known in the U.S. as the NAS, is a “network of airspace; air 
navigational facilities, equipment, and services; airports or landing areas; 
aeronautical charts, information, and services; rules, regulations, and 
procedures; technical information, manpower, and material.”45  
The NAS is regulated and operated by the FAA and is one of the most 
advanced and efficient aviation systems in the world. It supports commercial, 
general, and military aviation operations, ensuring the timely and efficient flow of 
goods, services, and support. Also, as part of the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan, the NAS is considered “critical infrastructure”46 for the U.S. 
economy and our national security, sustaining a global aviation industry 
estimated at roughly $3 trillion a year: 8 percent of the world’s gross domestic 
product.47  
The NAS consists of approximately 4,500 air navigation facilities, 18,000 
airports or landing areas, 750 air traffic control facilities, and over 48,000 FAA 
employees who ensure the network is safe, efficient, and robust 24 hours a day, 
7 days a week.48 The capacity and complexity of the NAS is expected to expand 
                                            
45 Federal Aviation Administration, Aeronautical Information Manual: Official Guide to Basic 
Flight Information and ATC Procedures, February 11, 2010.  
46 Department of Homeland Security, “Transportation Systems Critical Infrastructure Sector-
Specific Plan,” May 2007, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-transportation.pdf. 
47 Clinton Oster and John Strong, Managing the Skies: Public Policy, Organization and 
Financing of Air Traffic Management (Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 5. 




in order to support an estimated 50 percent increase in air traffic by 2025.49 This 
estimate does not account for UAS operations. Yet, one of the issues facing UAS 
integration into the NAS is the ability of UAS to fly alongside general and 
commercial aviation aircraft. Only in limited circumstances does this occur today. 
Most UAS operations today operate in special use airspace, such as restricted 
and prohibited areas, where commercial airliners and private pilots do not fly. 
Yet, introducing routine UAS operations into a dynamic and complex airspace 
system poses immediate challenges to integration; these were highlighted in 
Chapter I. This chapter will examine the evolution of the NAS and the legal 
framework that governs aircraft certification and operation. This background will 
provide readers insight on the complexity of the NAS and how it impacts 
integrating UAS with manned aircraft.  
A. NAS EVOLUTION 
In 1926, the U.S. Congress passed the Air Commerce Act, charging the 
Secretary of Commerce with “fostering air commerce, issuing and enforcing air 
traffic rules, licensing pilots, certifying aircraft, establishing airways, and 
operating and maintaining aids to air navigation.”50 The Aeronautic Branch within 
the Department of Commerce, later called Bureau of Air Commerce, was 
responsible for implementing and enforcing these responsibilities. As commercial 
flying increased, air traffic control (ATC) facilities were set up along airways to 
provide flight advisory and separation services.  
In 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Act transferred federal responsibilities from 
the Bureau of Air Commerce to the Civil Aeronautics Authority. This authority 
was responsible for ATC, airman and aircraft certification, safety enforcement, 
                                            
49 Federal Aviation Administration, Next Generation Air Transportation System Video, “FAA 
Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Years 2011–2031,” 
http://faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aviation_forecasts/aerospace_forecasts/2
011-2031/media/review%20of%202010.pdf.  
50 Arnold Briddon, Ellmore Champie, and Peter Marraine, Federal Aviation Administration 
Historical Fact Book: A Chronology 1926 to 1971 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1974), 9. 
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and airway development.51 Later, in 1940, the CAA was split into the Civil 
Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The 
newly formed CAA was responsible for ATC, safety programs, and airway 
development. The CAB, which functioned independently, was delegated 
responsibility for safety rulemaking, accident investigation, and economic 
regulation of commercial aviation.52  
The introduction of jet aircraft and increase in air traffic, followed by a 
series of major air disasters, prompted the U.S. government’s passage of the 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, which transferred CAA functions to the Federal 
Aviation Agency.53 The FAA Act assigned safety rulemaking and responsibility 
for ensuring the safe and efficient use of airspace by civil and military aircraft 
operators to the FAA. Also, the act provided for the regulation and promotion of 
civil aviation in a manner that would best promote its development and safety. In 
1967, the FAA was changed from an independent agency to an operating 
administration, known today as the Federal Aviation Administration, under the 
newly established Department of Transportation (DOT).54  
Over the next decade, NAS infrastructure was transformed to meet the 
rising demands of the aviation community. To accommodate the expected growth 
in aviation traffic major improvements were required in terminal airspace 
capacity, assuring aircraft separation, and reducing costs of ATC services. The 
ATC Advisory Committee formed during this era believed that midair collision 
problems could be overcome in airspace using radar surveillance.55 By the mid-
1970s, the FAA had implemented automated ATC radar systems at some of its 
busiest airports, enabling air traffic controllers to provide more effective aircraft  
 
                                            
51 Briddon, Champie, and Marraine, Federal Aviation Administration Historical Fact Book: A 
Chronology 1926 to 197, 34–35. 
52 Ibid., 39–40. 
53 Ibid., 84. 
54 Ibid., 165, 170. 
55 Ibid., 203. 
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separation services. Yet, business and the general traveling public’s increased 
reliance on air transport pushed the FAA to seek improved methods to keep up 
with demand.  
During the last two decades of the 20th century, the FAA implemented 
several plans that invested heavily in improving NAS infrastructure. In 1982, the 
FAA released a NAS Plan to modernize the nation’s airspace system by 
consolidating air route traffic control centers and improving advanced automated 
ATC equipment, surveillance, and communications technology.56 Also, new flight 
procedures were established that facilitated reduced aircraft separation. In 
February 1991, the FAA replaced the NAS Plan with the Capital Investment Plan, 
which is a 5-year plan that describes NAS modernization projects and associated 
funding levels.  
One of the projects discussed in the Capital Investment Plan that evolved 
early this century is the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) 
program. According to the NextGen Concept of Operations, its goals are to 
“significantly increase the safety, security, and capacity of air transportation 
operations….”57 The FAA asserts NextGen will completely transform the NAS 
and will contribute to the effort of safely incorporating UAS into the NAS.58 These 
benefits are being achieved through advances in technology, as well as new 
procedures and standards.  
                                            
56 Oster and Strong, Managing the Skies: Public Policy, Organization and Financing of Air 
Traffic Management, 123. 
57 Joint Planning and Development Office, “Concept of Operations for the Next Generation 
Air Transportation System,” Version 2.0, June 13, 2007, 
http://www.jpdo.gov/library/NextGen_v2.0.pdf. 
58 Federal Aviation Administration, “NextGen Implementation Plan,” March 2011, 
http://www.faa.gov/next en/media/ng2011_implementation_plan.pdf. 
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B. NAS AIRSPACE 
Some have likened the airspace above the U.S. to a soap opera plot due 
to its complexity and elaborate structure.59 However, understanding its 
configuration and the requirements for flying in each type of airspace can 
facilitate a better understanding of it. There are two categories of airspace in the 
NAS, regulatory and nonregulatory. Within these two types of airspace, there is 
controlled, uncontrolled, special use, and other airspace. According to the FAA’s 
Aeronautical Information Manual, the categories and types of airspace are 
dictated by “the complexity or density of aircraft movements, the nature of the 
operations conducted within the airspace, the level of safety required, and the 
national and public interest.”60  
Regulatory airspace is categorized as either Class A, B, C, D, or E 
airspace. It also includes restricted and prohibited areas. Regulatory airspace is 
controlled airspace in which ATC has the authority to control air traffic and is 
generally located in the vicinity of busier airports. Unless otherwise authorized, 
aircraft are required to comply with ATC clearances and are separated from other 
aircraft. Nonregulatory airspace is categorized as military operations areas, 
warning areas, alert areas, and controlled firing areas. This airspace is 
considered special use airspace because the activities occurring within it must be 
confined or may impose limitations upon other aircraft not taking part in the 
activities. Class G airspace is neither regulatory nor nonregulatory and is 
considered uncontrolled, or airspace in which ATC is not necessary for 
controlling air traffic or cannot be provided and generally includes aircraft flying in 
visual flight rule (VFR) conditions. Other airspace areas include military training  
 
 
                                            
59 Bruce Landsberg et al., “Airspace for Everyone,” Aircraft Owners and Pilot Association Air 
Safety Foundation, no. 38002, Edition 5, June 2009, 
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60 Federal Aviation Administration, Aeronautical Information Manual Official Guide to Basic 
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routes, terminal radar service areas, national security areas, and more. These 
classifications of airspace and the requirements for flying in each are further 
described in Table 1. 
 
Regulatory Airspace 
Class A (controlled 
airspace) 
Generally, that airspace from 18,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) up to and including 
flight level 600, including the airspace overlying the waters within 12 nautical miles 
(NM) of the coast of the 48 contiguous states and Alaska; and designated 
international airspace beyond 12 NM of the coast of the 48 contiguous states and 
Alaska within areas of domestic radio navigational signal or ATC radar coverage, and 
which domestic procedures are applied. 
Class B (controlled 
airspace) 
Generally, that airspace from the surface to 10,000 feet MSL surrounding the nation’s 
busiest airports in terms of instrument flight rule (IFR) operations or passenger 
enplanements. The configuration of each Class B airspace area is individually tailored 
and consists of a surface area and two or more layers (some Class B airspace areas 
resemble upside-down wedding cakes), and is designed to contain all published 
instrument procedures once an aircraft enters the airspace. An ATC clearance is 
required for all aircraft to operate in the area, and all aircraft that are cleared receive 
separation services within the airspace. The cloud clearance requirement for visual 
flight rule (VFR) operations is “clear of clouds.”  
Class C (controlled 
airspace) 
Generally, that airspace from the surface to 4,000 feet above the airport elevation 
(charted in MSL) surrounding those airports that have an operational control tower, 
are serviced by a radar approach control, and that have a certain number of IFR 
operations or passenger enplanements. Although the configuration of each Class C 
airspace area is individually tailored, the airspace usually consists of a 5 NM radius 
core surface area that extends from the surface up to 4,000 feet above the airport 
elevation, and a 10 NM radius shelf area that extends no lower than 1,200 feet up to 
4,000 feet above the airport elevation.  
Class D (controlled 
airspace) 
Generally, that airspace from the surface to 2,500 feet above the airport elevation 
(charted in MSL) surrounding those airports that have an operational control tower. 
The configuration of each Class D airspace area is individually tailored and when 
instrument procedures are published, the airspace will normally be designed to 
contain the procedures.  
Class E (controlled 
airspace) 
Generally, if the airspace is not Class A, Class B, Class C, or Class D, and it is 




Class G airspace is that portion of airspace that has not been designated as Class A, 




Contains airspace identified by an area on the surface of the earth within which the 
flight of aircraft, while not wholly prohibited, is subject to restrictions. Activities within 
these areas must be confined because of their nature or limitations imposed upon 




Contain airspace of defined dimensions identified by an area on the surface of the 
earth within which the flight of aircraft is prohibited. These areas are established for 




Area (special use 
airspace)  
Consist of airspace of defined vertical and lateral limits established for the purpose of 
separating certain military training activities from IFR traffic. Air combat tactics and low 





Airspace of defined dimensions that extend from 3 NM outward from the coast of the 
U.S. that contains activity that may be hazardous to nonparticipating aircraft. 
Alert Area (special 
use airspace) 
An area that contains a high volume of pilot training or an unusual type of aerial 
activity. 
Controlled Firing 
Area (special use 
airspace) 
An area that could be hazardous to nonparticipating aircraft and similar to other 
nonregulated airspace except that activities occurring within them are suspended 
immediately when there are indications that other aircraft might be approaching the 
area.  
Source: FAA Aeronautical Information Manual 
Table 1.   Airspace Classifications  
C. RULES FOR UAS CERTIFICATION AND OPERATION  
The legal framework that oversees UAS certification and operation within 
the U.S. is vast and complex and designed to accommodate mostly manned 
aircraft. It consists of regulations, procedures, orders, standards, handbooks, etc. 
This framework is intended to provide some level of assurance that aircraft will 
operate safely, posing minimal risk to persons and property. Specifically, Title 14 
CFR, also known as Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR), prescribes the rules for 
aviation in the U.S. These rules are separated into numerous sections called 
parts. These parts include airworthiness certification, maintenance, aircraft 
registration, pilot training and certification, airspace, air traffic and general 
operating rules, and many others. Although there are many parts to FAR, the 
ones most applicable to UAS that will be discussed in this thesis are Parts 91 
and 61.  
Federal Aviation Regulation Part 91 prescribes rules for operating aircraft 
other than moored balloons, kites, unmanned rockets, unmanned free balloons, 
and ultra-light vehicles. It prescribes that for any aircraft to fly legally in the U.S. it 
must be certified airworthy by the FAA. To be certified as airworthy, an aircraft 
“must conform to its type design” and “must be in a condition for safe 
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operation.”61 Safe operation refers to the “condition of an aircraft relative to wear 
and deterioration.”62 An aircraft has attained conformity to its type design when 
“its configuration and the engine, propeller, and articles installed are consistent 
with the drawings, specifications, and other data that are part of the type certified 
aircraft.”63 An aircraft will not be considered airworthy if one or both of these 
conditions is not met.  
Besides standard airworthiness certification, there are six special 
airworthiness certificates available for aircraft that do not meet the requirements 
for a standard certificate but are capable of safe flight. These certificates are 
often specified for experimental and special purpose aircraft and include primary, 
restricted, limited, light-sport aircraft, experimental, and special flight permits. 
Civil operators of UAS in the NAS (e.g., private industry) are required to obtain 
operational approval under the special airworthiness certificate, experimental 
category, and are issued only for the purpose of research and development, crew 
training, and market surveys.64 Public operators of UAS (e.g., DoD, CBP) are 
required to follow the COA process highlighted in paragraph D of this chapter.  
In addition to standard and special airworthiness certificates that allow 
aircraft to enter the NAS, there are certain types of aerial vehicles that have 
many of the requirements, procedures, and regulations waived. These vehicles 
include moored balloons, unmanned rockets, unmanned balloons, and ultra-light 
aircraft. Although these aerial vehicles may proceed with waivers, they only do so 
with specific restrictions to facilitate their safe operation.  
Furthermore, FAR Part 91 requires that “when weather conditions permit, 
regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or 
visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an 
                                            
61 Federal Aviation Administration, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft and Related 
Products, FAAO 8130.2G, August 31, 2010.  
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 2–1. 
64 Ibid., 3–4. 
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aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.”65 The “see and avoid” requirement 
of this regulation is one of the FAA’s primary safety concerns limiting UAS 
operations. Hence, alternate methods of compliance are required to achieve the 
see and avoid function in order for UAS to be granted approval to operate. In 
addition, a pilot flying under VFR is required to maintain certain horizontal and 
vertical distances from clouds.  
Just as manned aircraft are to be certified airworthy, unless waived, the 
pilot in command also has to meet certain requirements to legally fly aircraft. Part 
61 of the FAR states “no person may serve as a required pilot or flight 
crewmember of a civil aircraft of the United States, unless that person has a pilot 
certificate….”66 Each pilot certificate further specifies the aircraft category, class, 
and type that may be operated by the pilot.  
D. CURRENT UAS GUIDANCE 
As mentioned above, Title 14 CFR prescribes the rules that govern the 
certification and operation of aircraft in the NAS, albeit mostly intended for 
manned aircraft. In response to the growing demand for UAS operations, the 
FAA has issued interim operational approval guidance, which highlight two 
methods for seeking approval to operate in the NAS—airworthiness certificate 
and COA.  
First, the airworthiness certificate was discussed in the previous section 
and mostly applies to aircraft operating as civil aircraft (aircraft used by 
commercial or private operators). According to the FAA, only special 
airworthiness certificates in the experimental category are being issued for UAS 
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operating as civil aircraft with accompanying operational restrictions.67 These 
have mostly been issued for the purposes of research and development, UAS 
flight crew training, market surveys, and manned aircraft integrated with UAS 
technology.  
The second method for UAS operators to seek approval to operate within 
the NAS is the COA. The COA applies to UAS operating as public aircraft: 
aircraft used by DoD, CBP, or other public institution. The FAA’s Interim Approval 
Guidance Notice 08-01, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations in the U.S. 
National Airspace System, prescribes the procedures for UAS operators to follow 
when seeking approval to operate. Because UAS operations must be conducted 
at an acceptable level of safety (see next chapter for further details), operators 
are required to establish airworthiness by demonstrating that a collision with 
another aircraft or other airspace user is extremely improbable, as well as comply 
with appropriate cloud and terrain clearances as described in Title 14 Part 91. 
Also, when operating UAS outside of restricted areas and warning areas, the 
COA applicant must submit his/her request at least 60 days prior to the proposed 
UAS operational date. According to the FAA, a formal response is provided to the 
individual requesting the COA within 60 days, and once issued, a COA is valid 
for up to one year.  
Federal Aviation Regulations do not specifically mention UAS, hence 
current aviation regulations have been assumed to apply equally to all aircraft 
categories, including UAS. But, applying current aviation regulations that are 
tailored mostly for manned aircraft to UAS has posed constraints. To better 
understand these constraints, Chapter IV will evaluate flight safety by examining 
the FAA’s principle of equivalent level of safety, UAS safety performance, and 
public perception.  
                                            
67 Federal Aviation Administration Notice, “Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National 
Airspace System,” Docket No. FAA-2006-25714, 
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IV.  FLIGHT SAFETY  
Inability to meet FAA safety requirements, high accident rates, fear, and 
lack of public support are common themes proliferated throughout the literature 
regarding UAS integration. Aviation safety campaigners have even claimed 
“[UAS] operations would risk the safety of other planes, passengers on the 
ground, and people living near airports.”68 As a result, the FAA has put in place 
procedures for limited approval of UAS operations, following a case-by-case 
safety review through the COA or special airworthiness certificate process 
(discussed in Chapter III). These procedures help “to avoid any situations in 
which a UAS would endanger other users of the NAS or compromise the safety 
of persons or property on the ground.”69  
However, are UAS as unsafe as some have claimed and, if so, are these 
claims warranted? This chapter will attempt to answer these questions by 
providing an assessment of three areas found in the literature covering UAS flight 
safety. These areas are equivalent level of safety (ELOS), reliability of safety 
performance data, and public perception.  
A. EQUIVALENT LEVEL OF SAFETY  
According to the FAA, safe integration of UAS in the NAS requires 
assurances that they can operate at a safety level equivalent to that of manned 
aircraft. Because unmanned aircraft systems operate differently from manned 
aircraft, some have questioned whether they should be held to the same level of 
safety. Not surprising, defining ELOS in terms of requirements and standards has  
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been a challenge for operators, manufacturers, and regulators. Nevertheless, 
safety risks are inescapable in the operations of any complex system, and UAS 
are no exception.  
The ELOS standard for see and avoid has become a salient fixture for 
UAS operations. The fear of a UAS colliding with another aircraft (or other 
obstacle) in flight or on the ground has become a pressing safety concern that 
has often become the main point of discussion among aviation stakeholders. 
With regards to collision avoidance, aviation regulations stipulate that all aircraft 
be vigilant in maintaining safety, in visual or instrument conditions, regardless of 
type of aircraft.70 This requires pilots to be able to see other aircraft and 
obstacles and to safely steer clear of them. For aircraft with an on-board pilot, 
this appears to be an easy feat, as they can visually scan outside the cockpit 
window for other aircraft and obstacles. For UAS, this requires sensors that can 
detect aircraft whose presence may not be observable from other sources, such 
as radar or collision avoidance systems.  
To ensure on-board pilots have adequate field of view outside their cockpit 
windows, aviation standards stipulate cockpit field of view requirements (both 
horizontally and vertically) according to airframe design. However, these 
standards do not always guarantee that pilots can see other aircraft (although 
most are equipped with collision avoidance systems). According to some 
analysts on the topic, pilots of manned aircraft are poor at identifying potential 
collisions, even during flight operations occurring in clear daylight.71 Not all pilots 
have the same visual acuity and depth perception, nor do they spend equal time 
and follow proper technique looking out of the cockpit window.72  
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If research indicates that humans looking out of the cockpit window are 
not always vigilant at detecting other air traffic and obstacles, it appears not to be 
prudent to apply the same see and avoid standard to UAS. Unmanned aircraft 
systems are unique and should not be held to the exact standards as manned 
aircraft. Sensor technologies, such as ground based [and airborne] detect, 
sense, and avoid can prevent mid-air collisions between UAS and other 
aircraft.73 This technology includes transponders, electro-optical, infrared radar, 
and synthetic aperture radar. Although each type of technology has advantages 
and constraints (i.e., weight, cost, size, etc.), UAS can be equipped with sensor 
technology that is most suited for its designed mission and operating 
characteristics. A 2007 study conducted by Carnegie Mellon University on the 
integration of UAS into the NAS concluded that “sense and avoid technology is 
important only in airspace with significant traffic density.”74 The study also 
compared a UAS used for weather reconnaissance to a WC-130J Hercules 
manned aircraft. It noted that currently available sense and avoid technology for 
the UAS cause significant decrease in cost effectiveness, but does not cause it to 
be more expensive than the WC-130J. Further noting that UAS is not only 
operationally viable, but affordable.  
Requiring that UAS safety be equivalent to that of manned aircraft may not 
always be the best course of action.75 The level of safety needed for UAS must 
be considered according to form, fit, and function and their mission profile, as 
there are many variations being produced today.  
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B. UAS SAFETY PERFORMANCE  
The Predator B UAS, which is manufactured by General Atomics and 
CBP’s UAS of choice, “has a reliability record that exceeds that of manned 
aircraft.”76 Nevertheless, safety activists are quick to claim that UAS accident 
rates are much higher than manned aircraft accident rates. In truth, there have 
been few UAS accidents within the continental U.S., so safety concerns are 
largely based on data derived from overseas military use. But when analyzed, 
the data regarding UAS accidents may not be as dependable as critics perceive 
it to be. The FAA has recognized this consistency problem and acknowledges 
that operational and safety data is limited and may not be a representative 
sampling of UAS operations.77 An FAA report underscores this notion.  
In 2004, the FAA completed a report that reviewed and analyzed UAS 
accident data in hopes of identifying factors related to their use.78 As the U.S. 
armed forces is by far the largest user of UAS today, the FAA obtained accident 
data from Army, Navy, and Air Force Safety Centers. Accident data from 1980 to 
2004 was provided for the Army’s Hunter and Shadow UAS, from 1986 to 2002 
for the Navy’s Pioneer UAS, and from 1999 to 2003 for the Air Force’s Predator 
and Global Hawk UAS. The data reported for each type of UAS indicated that the 
two biggest problems were system reliability and human factors. System 
reliability problems entailed failures of electrical and mechanical components in 
the airframe. Human factors problems associated with UAS included display 
design deficiencies located in UAS ground control stations, procedural errors, 
flight crew skills errors, and other human factors issues.79 The most critical 
reason cited for these problems was cost savings, which are inclined to occur in 
areas, such as component reliability and system redundancy.  
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Although this report does highlight some problems, the data collected on 
each UAS was not as detailed as that found for manned aircraft accidents. There 
are two possible reasons: decreased level of analysis and UAS classification. 
First, because most UAS are less expensive than manned aircraft, researchers 
assert they do not warrant the same level of analysis.80 In addition, since a 
majority of UAS safety data is collected by the military, as it is the largest user 
overseas and domestic operations are limited, it is difficult to obtain safety 
statistics regarding their operation. Second, as described in Chapter II, the 
nomenclature for unmanned aircraft has been diverse and evolving. Until 
recently, they were classified as anything other than aircraft. The Army and Navy 
have traditionally classified them as vehicles, meaning that any accident 
involving them were treated in the same fashion as a ground vehicle, further 
distorting UAS safety data.  
Additionally, the potential misleading character of safety data for UAS can 
also be attributed to fielding UAS that have not completed their acquisition 
development programs and comparing them to manned aircraft based on a unit 
of measure per 100,000 flying hours. First, the DoD noted in a 2004 Defense 
Science Board study that “many early systems [UAS] were not developed or 
procured under standard acquisition program rules and that such specifications 
on system reliability were often absent.”81 Because their ISR capabilities were in 
such high demand by the DoD and CIA during the late 20th century, UAS flew 
missions while still under development. Second, accident rates for manned and 
unmanned aircraft are calculated per 100,000 flying hours. When each type of 
aircraft is compared to the other, these safety statistics can be taken out of 
context since UAS have significantly less flying time compared to manned 
aircraft. Also, most manned aircraft have a higher mishap rate in their first 50,000 
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flying hours than their second 50,000 hours inferring that as UAS flight hours 
increase one could expect the number of accidents to decrease.82 Figure 1 
depicts this concept best.  
The data in Figure 1 shows the relationship between Class A and B 
mishaps83 per 100,000 flight hours and the cumulative flight hours of two 
manned aircraft, F-16 and U-2, and five UAS, Global Hawk, Hunter, Predator, 
Shadow, and Pioneer. According to the trend lines in Figure 1, the number of 
mishaps for each UAS has decreased as the number of flight hours increased. In 
particular, the safety performance for Global Hawk and Predator UAS indicate a 
historical trend similar to that of the F-16 aircraft.  
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Source: Department of Defense FY2009–2034 UAS Integrated Roadmap 
Figure 1.   U.S. Military Aircraft and UAS Class A or B Mishap Rates, 1986–
2006 
Although there is potential for safety data that has been collected, 
calculated, and depicted to be misleading, UAS operations within the NAS have 
grown indicating that safety has and will continue to improve. Since 2005, the 
FAA issued over 78 experimental certificates for 17 different UAS types, and over 
the last two years over 400 COAs have been issued to 95 users. However, the 
FAA claims that in order to fully integrate UAS into the NAS, more safety data is 
needed. Until this occurs, the concern over UAS safety will be influenced by the 
variations of public perception. 
C. PUBLIC PERCEPTION  
Safety remains foremost on the minds of UAS manufacturers, operators, 
airspace users, and regulators. However, in no small part, the concern over UAS 
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safety is also affected by public perception. Public perception is affected, 
positively or negatively, by statistical data, emotional and safety persuasions that, 
in turn, can instill support for or against UAS integration efforts.  
In 2003, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics published 
a public opinion survey tested whether the public could be persuaded into 
acceptance of UAS integration by providing each participant UAS statistical data 
and emotional and safety persuasions.84 The survey indicated that UAS use for 
commercial and humanitarian missions (i.e., fire fighting, crop dusting, 
meteorology research, etc.) and cargo transportation are perceived as 
acceptable forms of UAS application by the public. The survey did not indicate 
that statistical data alone (as opposed to only emotional and safety persuasion 
data) was enough to persuade acceptance of UAS integration. However, it did 
indicate that when a combination of statistical data and emotional and safety 
persuasion data were given, survey participants significantly support the FAA in 
allowing UAS applications. The survey also highlighted that the FAA is 
“enormously persuaded by public perception.”85 Understanding these types of 
social behaviors can obviously be a tool, which critics, as well as supporters, can 
use to garner support for or against UAS integration initiatives.  
While much debate over domestic UAS integration focuses on the safety 
risks posed by UAS, less attention is given to the potential safety benefits. The 
DoD is the leading contributor for advancing UAS technology and has put safety 
foremost. Many of the new technologies and procedures being researched, 
tested, and implemented for UAS improve safety for civilian and military, manned 
and unmanned aircraft. However, no matter how much time and money is 
dedicated to improving safety, there is still no guarantee that accidents will not 
occur. In January 2011, an American Airlines Boeing 777 narrowly missed having 
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a mid-air collision with two U.S. Air Force C-17 aircraft.86 The Boeing 777 and the 
McDonnell Douglas C-17 are two of the most technologically advanced aircraft 
flying today, having accumulated several thousand flying hours. Nevertheless, 
the accident potential of manned aircraft, no matter how advanced, still exists. 
This same scenario will no doubt apply to UAS as they become more integrated 
with other aircraft; but only then can regulators, researchers, and manufacturers 
identify problems so that UAS can continuously be improved.  
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V. NATIONAL STRATEGY AND UAS AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
CAPABILITY  
A. NATIONAL STRATEGY 
During the Cold War, adversaries and their weapons of choice were fixed 
and widely known by the Western world. When communism came to an end 
during the early 1990s so did an era of constancy. The 1993 attack on the World 
Trade Center and 1995 bombing of the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City were signs of the types of threat that would confront the U.S. as it 
approached the new century. America’s wake-up call would not come until 
September 11, 2001, when four aircraft, hijacked by radical Muslims, were used 
as weapons to attack the U.S. homeland. Since these tragic actions, a 
tremendous effort in time and money has been spent transforming America’s 
institutions and reshaping mindsets. Strategy has been the key from which this 
transformation has occurred. It has been the catalyst for change revolutionizing 
America’s approach to homeland security from a capability-based approach to a 
threat-based approach using technology as a force enhancer. 
This chapter introduces four security strategies that help to form a security 
framework, which UAS operations can help to support. These strategies are the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Security Strategy, the 
National Strategy for Counterterrorism, and DoD’s strategy for homeland 
defense. The strategies together present a common theme; they rely upon 
interconnected and complementary systems that ensure America’s homeland 
security objectives are met. Following an introduction to each strategy, the 
chapter will conclude by describing how UAS can be used as an alternative 
capability in helping to fulfill America’s strategic security objectives.  
1. National Strategy for Homeland Security 
In July 2002, the first National Strategy for Homeland Security was issued, 
setting in motion America’s new framework for securing its homeland. This new 
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framework was centered almost exclusively around terrorism and the al-Qaeda 
network. Although its intent in combating terrorism was met with much progress, 
natural disasters, namely Hurricane Katrina, highlighted more vulnerabilities to 
America’s security shield. Consequently, in October 2007 the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security was revised, to account for an all-hazards approach that 
was founded upon preventing terrorist attacks at home and strengthening our 
nation’s preparedness for both natural and manmade disasters. The 2007 
strategy “provides a common framework by which our entire nation should focus 
its efforts on four goals: prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; protect the 
American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources; respond to and 
recover from incidents that do occur; and continue to strengthen the foundation 
to ensure our long-term success.”87  
a. Prevent and Disrupt Terrorist Attacks  
The first goal of the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security 
is to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks. This requires denying terrorists, their 
weapons, and other terror-related materials entry into the U.S. and disrupting 
terrorists and their capacity to operate.88 Hence, the detection, disruption, and 
interdiction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) related materials, along with 
denying terrorists entry into the U.S., is among the most important missions of 
homeland security.89 Fulfilling these missions will require integrating operational 
and intelligence efforts at all levels of government, the private sector, and 
international partners.90  
In addition, the homeland security strategy attempts to deny 
terrorists’ ability to move across and within our borders and requires improving 
the legal means for entering while disrupting illicit passages into and across the 
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U.S. Hence, an integrated system of people, technology, and tactical 
infrastructure is needed to detect, identify, and respond to all entry attempts.91 
This dynamic system to enhance integration will require a domain awareness 
that relies on the collection and sharing of information. 
b. Protect the American People, Our Critical Infrastructure, 
and Key Resources 
Preventing and disrupting terrorist attacks so that people, 
infrastructure, and resources are protected requires deterrence of the threat, 
mitigation of our nation’s vulnerabilities, and reduction of consequences.92 Some 
critics may dismiss deterrence as being a remnant of a Cold War strategy in 
which superpower confronts superpower, therefore not applicable to terrorists’ 
obscure tactics and networks.93 Others maintain that deterrence can work if the 
enemy understands that the policy of the U.S. is to eradicate them.94 Although 
this type of strategy may seem more acceptable in a war zone abroad, it is not 
within the borders of the U.S. Instead, the homeland security strategy calls for a 
“deterrence through denial” concept. This concept hinges on decreasing the 
chances that terrorists are likely to achieve their objectives or that the costs of 
their efforts are too high.95 One way to achieve this objective is to deny terrorist 
actors their ability to move weapons and materials into the U.S. by filling gaps in 
security coverage within and along our borders.96  
Mitigating vulnerabilities to acts of terrorism, manmade and natural 
disasters can also provide protection of Americans and increase confidence and 
                                            
91 The Office of the President of the United States, “National Strategy for Homeland 
Security,” 19. 
92 Ibid., 25. 
93 Uri Fisher, “Deterrence, Terrorism, and American Values,” Homeland Security Affairs III, 
no. 1 (February 2007), http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=3.1.4.  
94 Ibid., 2. 
95 The Office of the President of the United States, “National Strategy for Homeland 
Security,” 25. 
96 Ibid., 26. 
 40
support for homeland security objectives. Thus, fortifying critical infrastructure 
and key resources becomes vital. Critical infrastructure are "systems and assets, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the U.S. that the incapacity or destruction 
of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national 
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those 
matters."97 Despite attempts to mitigate vulnerabilities to public and private 
critical infrastructure, future terrorist attacks and disasters will occur. Taking this 
into account, the homeland security strategy underlines the importance of 
implementing early steps to reduce the consequences. Such steps entail 
improved notification, alert, and warning systems by leveraging modern 
technology.98  
c. Respond to and Recover From Incidents 
The homeland security strategy calls for a system that can “quickly 
adapt to the full range of catastrophic scenarios confronting our nation and 
integrate capabilities and resources from all stakeholders.”99 Accordingly, the 
nation will respond to all hazards by quickly and competently assessing the 
situation and taking action; expanding operational capabilities as needed; 
commencing short-term recovery actions; and effectively transferring to long-term 
rebuilding.100 If quickly and effectively implemented, these activities can help to 
save lives, mitigate suffering, and protect property. 
d. Strengthen the Foundation to Ensure Long-Term 
Success 
The last goal depicted in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security emphasizes the need to strengthen the principles, systems, structures, 
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and institutions that join together the homeland security enterprise and support 
its numerous activities. Of the many elements that will continue to be 
strengthened, in particular, science and technology and leveraging instruments of 
national power will become more vital in helping to secure our nation.  
First, the proliferation of technology throughout the world has given 
adversaries greater access to devices that can be used to harm us or thwart our 
attempts to prevent an attack on the U.S. For that reason, the homeland security 
strategy underscores the importance of employing technology. Second, 
leveraging the instruments of national power, especially access to information, 
becomes even more important. Partnerships among all levels of government, the 
private sector, and foreign partners are needed to detect, prevent, disrupt, 
preempt, and mitigate effects of manmade or natural disasters.101 Thus, 
technology that can rapidly collect and disseminate real-time information will be 
critical.  
2. National Security Strategy 
The notion that defeating terrorism at home begins with operations abroad 
is no longer a sufficient strategy. Although the U.S. must continue to wage a 
global campaign to defeat terrorism, a strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 
terrorists and extremist groups must begin by first securing America’s homeland. 
The National Security Strategy, dated May 2010, emphasizes these critical 
elements to America’s security and calls for a partnered approach to 
strengthening it. To make it work, the plan relies on intelligence, law 
enforcement, and homeland security capabilities for collecting and sharing 
information.102 
In particular, strengthening security at home will require denying hostile 
actors the ability to operate along and within U.S. borders, and protecting and 
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reducing vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure. In the unfortunate event that an 
attack caused by terrorism or other hostile actor or natural disaster does occur at 
home, America must be able to quickly respond and recover.  
3. National Strategy for Counterterrorism 
The 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism articulates America’s 
framework for countering global terrorism. One of the areas of focus in the 
strategy is to protect the homeland. This requires an offensive and defensive 
approach to disrupt terrorist plots, prevent terrorists from entering the U.S., or 
from operating freely inside U.S. borders. Although the strategy primarily focuses 
on al-Qaida, it underlines the need to examine other potentially violent foreign 
and domestic groups and individuals. This is especially important in the wake of 
the November 2009 Fort Hood massacre, in which one of America’s own 
defenders of freedom engaged in terrorist acts of violence.  
The National Strategy for Counterterrorism reinforces what the previous 
two strategies called for: investing in capabilities that enhance our ability to 
detect, disrupt, and defeat terrorist plots along our borders. In addition, it requires 
critical infrastructure protection (CIP), ability to detect illicit use of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical materials, and relies on access to vital information 
maintained by federal, state, local, and tribal institutions.103  
4. Department of Defense Strategy for Homeland Security 
Although close examination of the DoD’s role in homeland security is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it should be noted that it continues its vital role in 
defending America’s homeland through homeland defense missions and support 
to civil authorities. The U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is DoD’s 
operational command established after 9/11 to unify DoD efforts to defend the 
homeland. USNORTHCOM’s mission encompasses “the protection of the United 
States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense 
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infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed 
by the President.”104 Civil support missions include providing military assistance 
(personnel and equipment) to non-military entities. These missions include 
domestic relief operations that occur from natural disasters¸ counter-drug 
operations, and consequence management resulting from a WMD threat.105  
This section presented a strategic security framework that focuses on 
preventing terrorist attacks, reducing America’s vulnerabilities, and minimizing 
damage and recovering from attacks that do occur within U.S. borders. The next 
section will describe how UAS can be used as an alternative capability in helping 
to fulfill the objectives highlighted in America’s security strategies. 
B. UAS AS AN ALTERNATIVE CAPABILITY 
Despite the countless hours and billions of dollars spent by public and 
private institutions fortifying the nation’s security and resilience, criminal 
networks, violent extremist groups, insurgents, as well as mother nature, 
continue to threaten America’s homeland security. Hence, a capability that is 
effective, flexible, and affordable is needed to help bolster homeland security 
requirements. This capability can be found in UAS; specifically for border 
protection, law enforcement, and critical infrastructure protection.  
1. Border Protection  
The concern for a more secure border has multiplied since 9/11 as many 
U.S. citizens fear that terrorists could enter the U.S. from Mexico or Canada.106 
Trafficking illicit drugs along U.S. borders contributes to the threat of terrorist 
activity by supplying cash, creating instability, supporting corruption, providing a 
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cover for sustaining infrastructures for illicit activity, and competing for law 
enforcement and intelligence attention.107 Demands for drugs and other 
contraband have grown in recent years boosting the violence in Mexico and 
along our borders. According to analysts, $19 to $29 billion each year flows from 
the U.S. into Mexico in money and weapons to fuel the violence.108 For this 
reason, it is no coincidence Americans are concerned that an increase in drug 
violence along U.S. borders could potentially lead to terrorist activity.  
The National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Security 
Strategy, and the National Strategy for Counterterrorism each highlight a need 
for stronger land and maritime border protection. The U.S. border is a resource-
thin environment despite the government’s efforts to increase the number of CBP 
agents and other security devices. The Department of Homeland Security, 
through CBP and the U.S. Coast Guard, are the primary custodians of border 
security, responsible for approximately 7,000 miles of land border and over 
12,000 miles of maritime border.109 Filling the gaps in border security to prevent 
illegal trafficking of people, illegal drugs, weapons, and terrorist activity requires a 
layered approach. This approach can be realized with the use of UAS, which are 
well suited for the dull, dirty, and dangerous missions found within border 
protection and law enforcement.  
Customs and Border Protection recognized the utility in UAS for border 
security and started to experiment with the MQ-9 Predator B UAS along the 
southwestern border in 2005. The aircraft is an effective, low cost, and adaptable 
platform with a proven safety and performance record. These aircraft are able to 
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conduct missions in areas that are difficult to access, or are considered too high-
risk for manned aircraft or personnel on the ground. They help fulfill America’s 
homeland security strategy by performing surveillance coverage along porous 
sections of America’s borders. Their electro-optical sensors can provide precise 
and real-time imagery to ground control operators who can disseminate 
information to be used to deploy border patrol agents. Also, the UAS has a 
prolonged loitering capacity, ranging up to 20 hours without refueling that 
enables sustained air domain coverage improving border security.110  
Not only do UAS offer operational advantages, but cost advantages as 
well. A UAS costs a fraction of what a manned aircraft costs with similar 
operational capabilities. A 2004 congressional report identified the unit 
procurement cost of a Predator B UAS at approximately $4.5 million in 
comparison to the unit procurement cost of a P-3 Orion manned aircraft, used by 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which costs $36 million.111 Also, the cost 
and operational advantages of UAS are significantly better than other manned 
aircraft, such as Blackhawk helicopters, that are frequently used for border 
protection support.  
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 
has influenced the rapid use of UAS along U.S. borders. This act opened the 
doors for advanced technologies for border surveillance and law enforcement 
support along our northern and southwestern borders. Title V, Subtitles A and B 
of the act, gave the Secretary of Homeland Security authorization to implement a 
pilot program to test various advanced technologies that could improve border 
security between ports of entry along the northern and southwestern borders of 
the U.S.112 Since its enactment, IRPTA enabled DHS to make great strides 
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employing the use of UAS technology for surveillance support along our borders. 
Federal government funding to operate, support, and purchase Predator UAS for 
CBP from 2006 to 2010 totaled approximately $121 million.113  
UAS are as effective as manned aircraft in patrolling U.S. coastal borders. 
The Fiscal Year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act directed DHS to explore 
the use of UAS for maritime flight operations. Subsequently, DHS appropriated 
$15 million for a UAS program resulting in a modified “Guardian” Predator B 
UAS.114 This system will increase the U.S. Coast Guard’s surveillance 
capabilities for joint counter-narcotics operations in the southeast coastal border 
region and along the Great Lakes. These systems can provide a “comprehensive 
picture of activity in the maritime environment, as well as give law enforcement a 
more accurate tool to use in sorting illegal from legitimate activity.”115  
2. Law Enforcement 
UAS are receiving more attention to assist federal, state, and local police 
officials in protecting the American people. They can be used to help fight crime, 
monitor crowds and automobile traffic, and conduct search and rescue missions. 
For example, a UAS patrolling overhead can detect and monitor civil unrest and 
disturbances, as well as spot cars speeding along interstates and highways. 
They can also be used to support special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams. 
For example, a Texas SWAT team from Austin, Texas, used UAS technology to 
facilitate the arrest of a man suspected of storing large amounts of drugs and 
weapons in his home.116 The specialized law enforcement team used a small 
UAS, known as a Wasp, to conduct an aerial surveillance of the suspect’s 
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residence in fear that the man inside possessed immediate danger to any law 
enforcement helicopter flying overhead. The UAS was able to beam live video to 
agents on the ground, which enabled them to storm the house and arrest the 
suspect safely.  
Unmanned aircraft systems can significantly reduce operating costs, 
making them feasible for many law enforcement agencies.117 According to a U.S. 
Justice Department official, “unmanned aircraft are a rapidly emerging 
technology that has exceptional appeal to law enforcement.”118 Police 
departments in Houston and Miami have already begun testing small UAS 
platforms in their policing operations.119 As integration within the NAS becomes 
more routine, “the law enforcement community could be one of the largest UAS 
customers following the military.”120 The FAA expects small UAS to experience 
the greatest near-term growth in civil and commercial operations because of their 
versatility and relatively low initial cost and operating expenses. 
3. Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security identifies 17 critical 
infrastructures and key resources that must be structurally and operationally 
resilient to manmade threats and natural disasters. Although many of these 
infrastructures are interrelated, this section will examine emergency 
management, transportation, agriculture and food, and energy as the ones UAS 
are most suitable to support.  
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a. Emergency Management  
Within the last decade, the U.S. has faced several large-scale 
natural disasters. The 2004 hurricane season was estimated at causing over 
3,000 deaths and approximately $50 billion in damages.121 Hurricane Katrina 
caused more than 1,330 deaths and impacted nearly 93,000 square miles along 
the Gulf Coast.122 In 2007, there were more than 85,000 wildfires destroying over 
9 million acres in the U.S.123 Emergency management is a vital service entailing 
a comprehensive system that enables response and recovery efforts following 
the consequences of a manmade attack or natural disaster. It consists of 
disciplines from emergency management, emergency medical services, fire, 
hazardous material, law enforcement, bomb squads, tactical operations and 
special weapons assault teams, and search and rescue.124 Unmanned aircraft 
systems are well suited to provide support to first-responders working in any one 
of these key emergency management disciplines.  
In devastated areas where communications may be degraded or 
nonexistent, UAS can loiter overhead while providing a temporary bridge for 
which imagery and communications can be monitored and relayed. This type of 
support was provided to emergency response teams following the earthquake 
that flattened Haiti in 2010. A Global Hawk UAS operated over Haiti providing 
surveillance in the wake of the country’s 7.0 magnitude earthquake.125 It flew for 
14 hours collecting and disseminating real-time imagery that helped determine 
the level of destruction.  
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Unmanned aircraft systems are also uniquely capable of helping to 
support scientific research in helping to reduce the consequences of 
emergencies. For example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) began operating UAS in 2006 as a hurricane hunter. 
NOAA flies UAS into a hurricane and communicates near-real-time data directly 
to the National Hurricane Center. These unmanned aircraft fly closer to the 
water’s surface, collecting more accurate barometric pressure and temperature 
data than can safely be collected by manned aircraft. According to NOAA, “UASs 
can help meet its mission goals with a more advanced fleet capable of collecting 
data from areas that are currently inaccessible.”126 
In addition, the video and synthetic aperture radar capabilities on 
UAS can be used to provide imagery of river basins in support of flood response 
efforts. In early 2011, a CBP Predator was flown from Corpus Christi, Texas, to 
North Dakota to support the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers in mapping areas affected by flooding along the Red River Valley. 
In places, such as California and Colorado, major forest fires are a 
common occurrence, destroying thousands of acres of land every year. Hence, 
the U.S. Forest Service has explored the use of UAS technology in an effort to 
aid wildfire imaging and mapping capabilities for these parts of the U.S. In 2009, 
it flew a modified Predator B UAS over a 40,200-acre fire near Palm Springs, 
California, for 16 hours.127 The aircraft circled at 43,000 feet transmitting imagery 
that enabled the fire management team to pinpoint the perimeter of a dangerous 
blaze that killed five firefighters. According to fire management experts, UAS 
capability will “go a long way toward helping the forest service understand the 
science of these giant fires.”128 
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Furthermore, UAS can be flown into areas designated off limits due 
to increased chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) 
threats. They can be equipped with externally mounted CBRNE detection 
systems and flown at low, medium, or high altitudes to obtain samples while 
transmitting the detection data to scientists and engineers on the ground. Their 
ability to quickly respond and provide real-time digital information to emergency 
response teams awaiting initial assessment and follow-on support is vital. 
b. Transportation Infrastructure 
Transportation infrastructure is a broad category that consists of 
aviation, highway, maritime, mass transit, pipeline, and rail systems. Its 
continuous operation is vital to the movement of people and goods domestically 
and internationally. Manmade attacks against and natural disasters that affect 
any one of the transportation infrastructures could significantly disrupt the 
functioning of government and private entities and produce rippling effects felt 
within the immediate targeted sector while devastating the nation’s economy. 
Given the flexibility and mobility of UAS, they are well suited to monitor many 
parts of transportation infrastructure. In particular, UAS can inspect thousands of 
miles of pipeline that transport oil and gas within and across U.S. borders. With 
forward looking infrared (FLIR) technology mounted onboard the aircraft, UAS 
can easily detect oil and gas leaks. If undetected, these leaks can cause fires 
and explosions damaging land, property, and even loss of life.  
c. Agriculture and Food Infrastructure 
Agriculture and food infrastructure comprises of production, 
processing, and delivery systems. A disaster caused by an attack on this 
infrastructure could disrupt the food supply and pose a serious threat to public 
health, safety, welfare, or to the national economy.129 According to DHS, food 
and agriculture infrastructure “is almost entirely under private ownership and is 
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composed of an estimated 2.1 million farms, approximately 880,500 firms and 
over one million facilities.”130 It accounts for approximately one-fifth of the 
nation's economic activity.  
The capabilities provided by UAS can facilitate the monitoring of 
farm and agriculture related features, such as the spread of crop destroying 
pests, status of crop production, identification of crop varieties, and loss of timber 
in areas threatened by timber theft. Using UAS for crop spraying and dusting 
greatly reduces the exposure of people to hazards associated with chemical 
contamination. 
d. Energy 
The U.S. energy infrastructure fuels the nation’s economy. More 
than 80 percent of the country's energy infrastructure is owned by the private 
sector.131 It consists of three interrelated segments: electricity, petroleum, and 
natural gas.  
The electricity segment consists of a generating element consisting 
of more than 5,300 power plants and a distribution segment that uses over 
211,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines.132 The electricity infrastructure 
is highly automated and controlled by a regional grid system. Petroleum and 
natural gas segments consist of exploration, production, storage, transport, and 
refinement (in the case of oil). There are over 400,000 petroleum and gas wells 
within the U.S. and within its territorial waters, in addition to hundreds of 
refineries and processing plants.  
These electricity, petroleum, and natural gas areas and installations 
are difficult to guard. Damage caused by a terrorist attack or natural disaster can 
lead to enormous ecological damage and revenue losses, such as that 
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experienced in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010. This critical infrastructure 
is dispersed throughout the U.S. and its territorial waters leaving it vulnerable in 
many locations. Unmanned aircraft systems are a formidable capability that can 
be used to patrol critical infrastructure on a regular basis. Their FLIR camera can 
detect the presence of attackers who may be trying to penetrate its 
vulnerabilities. 
The national strategies discussed in this chapter provide America’s 
framework for securing its homeland. Their approach is part of an evolutionary 
process that changes as the security threat changes. Together, these strategies 
align common security objectives to a threat environment that is difficult to 
predict. No matter what the threat is or where it comes from there is emphasis on 
technology as a means to getting the job done. The technologies needed to 
support America’s changing threats have become harder to anticipate, as we 
cannot control the time, place, and force manmade or natural disasters will bring 
upon our nation. Unmanned aircraft systems offer an effective capability, 
specifically in the areas of border protection, law enforcement, and CIP.  
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VI. CONCLUSION  
A. REVIEW 
This thesis examined why UAS are not widely used domestically for 
homeland security support despite their many benefits. The literature introduced 
credits their sluggish integration to a poor safety record and technology that has 
not matured to allow safe routine operations. Other critics have suggested that 
regulations and standards for the development and operation of UAS are 
insufficient. Although it is commonly understood that flight safety should be 
foremost for any type of aircraft, defining what safe UAS operations entail has 
diverted attention away from defining a clear path forward.  
The historical background of UAS evolution indicates that these aircraft 
are nothing new; evolving since the early 20th century. However, throughout 
most of the 20th century their advancement varied with financial and political 
support, thereby reducing their development into a viable and alternative 
capability for aerial support. Not until the number of U.S. servicemen shot down 
over Vietnam increased, and later the shoot down of a U-2 spy plane over Soviet 
Union territory, did UAS receive so much attention. Advancements in computers 
and telecommunications during the late 20th century helped to further advance 
UAS as a viable military capability. Yet, the utility of UAS was not fully 
demonstrated until the start of the 21st century when their usage increased over 
the skies of Iraq and Afghanistan. Since then, UAS use has proliferated among 
the armed forces and has gained public and private recognition as a capability for 
homeland security support. 
The airspace operating and regulatory structure (known as the NAS) in 
which UAS operate, like all aircraft, has and will continue to transform to meet the 
needs of both public and private flying communities. This structure is a dynamic 
and complex network of airspace, systems, facilities, information, and people. It 
is primarily focused on the safe and efficient transit of aircraft operating in 
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differing levels of complexity and congestion. To meet the growing demands of 
the aviation community and increase in air traffic, NAS infrastructure has 
continued to evolve. Some of these changes included deregulation of airline 
operations, consolidation of airspace, implementation of advanced air traffic 
control equipment, surveillance, and communications technology, and 
improvements in flight regulations. Nevertheless, many regulations and 
standards today do not specifically account for UAS operations, leaving broad 
interpretations for their application based on manned aircraft.  
Safety is the fundamental concern over routine UAS integration. This 
thesis attempted to satisfy the question of whether the concerns over UAS safety 
are warranted or not. Due to the challenges and time constraints associated with 
obtaining empirical UAS safety data, the author examined existing government 
reports and studies. Specifically, a 2004 FAA sponsored report that summarized 
UAS accident and incident data and a 2004 Office of the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics sponsored study on UAS 
development. Together, these documents highlighted three important features: 1) 
UAS accident data is limited and taken out of context; 2) early versions of UAS 
were fielded prematurely and not allowed to fully develop under their acquisition 
programs; and 3) UAS safety has improved as their total flight hours has 
increased.  
No matter how safe any system is (i.e., aircraft, automobile, etc.) public 
perceptions can be damaged when accidents do occur. This thesis also explored 
this notion by examining a 2003 report on the public’s perception on UAS 
integration. The report noted that public perception can positively or negatively 
be affected by statistical data and emotional and safety persuasions. Of 
particular importance, the report found that the FAA can be persuaded by public 
perception. There is compelling documentation since some critics in government 
have suggested that the FAA is not acting fast enough to integrate UAS into the 
NAS. 
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While the first four chapters of this thesis provided insight into why UAS 
are not widely used domestically for homeland security support, Chapter V 
looked at a security framework, which UAS operations can help to support. The 
goals of the National Strategy for Homeland Security are to prevent and disrupt 
terrorist attacks, protect the American people, critical infrastructure and key 
resources, respond to and recover from incidents, and ensure long-term success. 
The National Security Strategy calls for a partnered approach to strengthening 
security and the National Strategy for Counterterrorism articulates America’s 
framework for countering global terrorism. These strategies rely upon an 
interconnected and complementary system that leverages technology to fortify 
America’s homeland.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The author supports arguments of those who claim UAS should be widely 
used domestically for homeland security support. Their growth has continued to 
increase and “has been the most dynamic growth sector of the world aerospace 
industry this decade.”133 They are effective and efficient and can significantly 
reduce the total ownership cost for an aerial support platform of similar capability. 
There are many organizations throughout state and local government and in 
private industry that can benefit from domestic UAS operations. Analysts 
estimate there are approximately “50 companies, universities, and government 
organizations that are developing and producing some 155 unmanned aircraft 
designs.”134 Yet, ensuring UAS operate safely in the NAS is the salient concern.  
If history is any indication of what the future holds, UAS safety will 
progress. This has already been the case, as the safety of UAS operations has 
improved. Trends in UAS mishaps have decreased as the number of flight hours 
has grown. Flight experience and improvements in technology are notable 
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contributions to this success. As of June 2011, CBP’s Predator UAS flew more 
than 1,000 successful missions and 10,000 hours supporting national security 
roles.135 Also, the increase in COAs and Experimental Airworthiness Certificates 
issued by the FAA to UAS operators is further evidence that UAS are safer and 
more easily being integrated in the NAS. The U.S. Air Force’s Global Hawk UAS 
was the first UAS to be granted an airworthiness certificate recognizing its ability 
to safely and routinely fly within the NAS without having to follow the COA 
process.136  
Although government, private industry, academia, and other UAS 
stakeholders have made improvements in addressing the challenges that have 
constrained UAS operations domestically, there is still more that needs to be 
done. Specifically, it is necessary to improve UAS reliability, change existing 
regulations and standards to account for peculiar UAS characteristics, and 
improve public perception. 
There are two ways to improve UAS reliability: 1) improve the integrity of 
components and systems and/or 2) build in redundancy (backup systems). For 
manned aircraft, additional costs are paid for multiple backup systems, thus 
increasing system reliability. However, for UAS, cost, weight, function, and 
performance considerations have been the primary concern foregoing installation 
of backup systems.137 Instead, aviation engineers and manufacturers should 
continue to put greater effort into improving the integrity of components. This 
would eliminate the cost and weight factors associated with designing and 
installing backup systems, still making UAS an operationally attractive and cost 
effective capability. Moreover, UAS have not traditionally been given the same 
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level of maintenance and operational support as manned aircraft, as these 
aircraft were often looked at as being expendable. If UAS concept of operations 
includes expendability, based on its designated mission profile, requiring their 
safety to be equivalent to manned aircraft may not always be the best course of 
action. For that reason, the level of safety for UAS should be considered 
according to form, fit, and function, as there are many variations being produced 
today.  
Also, the government should change existing regulations and standards to 
account for the peculiar operating characteristics of UAS. The FAA, in 
coordination with the aviation community, should continue to increase their 
efforts to find an agreeable solution to automate the capability to see and avoid 
to an equivalent level of safety that is consistent with UAS form, fit, and function 
so that pertinent FAA regulations and standards can be developed. The 
capability to see and avoid other aircraft is the ability for UAS to detect traffic, 
evaluate flight paths, determine the right of way, and maneuver safely. In 
essence, avoid a mid-air collision. Sense and avoid (SAA) is a technical solution 
for UAS to be able to meet the FAA requirement to see and avoid other aircraft. 
The FAA is currently engaged in SAA workshops to define performance 
parameters and assessment methodologies to safely implement SAA for UAS 
operations. However, the challenge with SAA today is not as much technical as it 
is regulatory.  
In addition to defining regulation and standards for see and avoid, the FAA 
in coordination with other civil aviation authorities, should agree on a proper 
classification of UAS. The nomenclature “UAS” is a general classification that 
encompasses their various sizes, shapes, uses, and means of control. To 
determine how they will integrate in the NAS requires specific classification. The 
DoD classifies UAS based on operating altitudes and endurance, such as high 
altitude, long endurance (HALE), medium altitude, long endurance (MALE), etc. 
Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority classifies UAS according to weight. 
Others have suggested that UAS should be classified according to the 
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classification of airspace needed for operations and navigational accuracy. No 
matter how UAS are classified, there needs to be a single solution so that 
standards and regulations can be developed.  
Furthermore, improvements in safety, technology, and regulation and 
standards mean little when it comes to public perception and political 
acceptance. The advanced high-resolution surveillance technology and real-time 
data transmission capability of UAS appears to have instilled fear in many who 
believe they will be misused and infringe upon their privacy and civil liberties. 
People fear that if UAS become part of the common homeland security toolset, 
there will be continuous surveillance of their activities leading some citizens to 
believe that their Fourth Amendment rights will be violated. For UAS to be 
accepted, the media and public must be convinced their benefits outweigh costs. 
The U.S. government must continue to put forth great efforts to ensuring the 
public that UAS operations will protect, not infringe upon their rights and civil 
liberties. Courts have been sensitive to this and have responded accordingly by 
requiring law enforcement officials obtain a warrant before engaging in 
surveillance activities in accordance with Fourth Amendment protection.  
In conclusion, our government’s greatest responsibility is the safety and 
security of the American people, whether it be from flight mishaps, natural 
disaster, or criminal or terrorist activity. The aviation regulatory structure that 
governs the NAS is designed to facilitate the safe and efficient operation of all 
aircraft. Likewise, America’s security strategies provide the framework that 
guides intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies. Unmanned aircraft 
systems are an operational and cost-effective capability for homeland security 
support. They offer advanced technologies for collecting and disseminating 
intelligence and security information for border protection and law enforcement 
agents. In addition, the vulnerabilities associated with critical infrastructures, such 
as emergency management, transportation, agriculture and food, and energy, 
are significant as they are all interrelated. The disruption or destruction of one will  
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most likely affect the others. Having an adaptable, first-response capability to 
patrol these critical and sometimes hostile areas will facilitate America’s ability to 
quickly respond and recover from such calamities. 
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